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Abstract: 
Congressional preferences are frequently categorized by a liberal to conservative dimension that 
splits the two-party system in the modern period. However, recent studies of voting in Congress 
have challenged that conception (Roberts et al. 2007, Crespin and Rohde 2010, Dougherty et al. 
2010). Scholarship that relies exclusively on the roll call record to explain congressional 
preferences may not account for other dimensions that exist in the legislative process. Partisan 
agenda control may further lower the dimensionality suggested by roll call voting. In this paper, 
the strength of the unidimensional model is tested. First, issue areas that should theoretically be 
poorly accounted for by the unidimensional model are examined. These issues are based on Aage 
Clausen’s “law of categorization” which argues that members of Congress have consistent issue 
preferences that vary based on the policy considered (Clausen 1974). Policy areas that vary by 
region are examined, as the economic benefit of a constituency (Fenno 1978) or the political 
culture of a district should affect voting preferences in Congress (Elazar 1994). The results of 
this analysis suggest that the unidimensional model performs poorly on many of these issue 
areas. Second, this paper demonstrates how the changing nature of the congressional agenda 
affects the importance of extra-dimensional preferences. By creating models using a subset of 
each Congress, this study shows that issues like abortion have risen on the agenda while a civil 
rights issue dimension is no longer active. Finally, using the evidence gathered in the previous 
sections, this paper examines the importance of issue areas on procedural votes as compared with 
roll calls which change the ideological content of a bill. The results suggest that parties during 
the Clinton years have overcome these issue dimensions during procedural votes, but votes that 
affect policy legislators may revert to issue based preferences. Overall, the results of this paper 
suggest that within specific issue areas, meetings of Congress, and types of roll calls, there is a 
systematic underperformance of the unidimensional model of preferences. 
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Introduction 
During consideration of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, the landmark health care 
legislation of Obama’s first term, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) encountered a roadblock.  
Speaker Pelosi would need nearly all of her party caucus, a 37 seat majority, to stand behind the 
bill for the legislation to pass. However, a group of 40 moderate Democratic members banded 
together to oppose consideration of the bill due to a possible loophole in the legislation that could 
funnel taxpayer money to provide abortions (MacGillis 2009). The bill could not proceed 
without the full support of the party caucus. Speaker Pelosi (D-CA), was forced to consider three 
separate amendments by Democratic members offering compromises on the question of abortion 
funding. Rep. Brad Ellsworth (D-IN), a recipient of the lowest possible rating from Planned 
Parenthood Action Fund for support of reproductive issues, offered one proposal that allowed 
private contractors to process abortion claims and prohibit health care exchanges from restricting 
access to plans covering the procedure. Rep. Lois Capps (D-CA), a staunch pro-choice activist, 
proposed removing all abortion language from the reform plan to prevent any growth or 
reduction in abortion coverage. The most restrictive proposed amendment on access and funding 
possibilities for abortions was proposed by Congressman Bart Stupak (D-MI) and Congressman 
Joseph Pitts (R-PA). After negotiations, and despite more “liberal” amendments being proposed, 
Pelosi was forced to allow consideration and a roll call vote on the Stupak-Pitts amendment with 
minor changes. The amendment passed with 64 Democratic yeas to be included in House version 
of the legislation.  
 Congressional scholars, who focus on a model of preferences that is a one-dimensional, 
liberal to conservative continuum, must have been puzzled by this result. Some Democrats 
voting for this amendment had ideological scores more liberal than that of President Obama. For 
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example, two of those liberal supporters were committee chairmen Dave Obey of Appropriations 
and Jim Oberstar of Transportation and Infrastructure. These liberal, yet pro-life, Roman 
Catholic Democrats pushed for changes to the bill on the question of abortion, yet were strong 
sponsors of the goal of the legislation. The story of Rep. Stupak and the pro-life Democrats who 
forced a vote on abortion funding in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act tells a 
different story. In an Washington Post op-ed Congressman Stupak explained: “I and other pro-
life Democrats are pleased that we were able to hold true to our principles and vote for a bill that 
is pro-life at every stage of life, and that provides 32 million Americans with access to high 
quality, affordable health care” (Stupak 2010). The ideology of these Democrats had two distinct 
components: a traditional liberal to conservative dimension on the role of government in assuring 
access to health care, and a second dimension on the issue of abortion. From the debate on 
slavery in the western territories, the coinage of silver, and civil rights these extra dimensions 
often come to define the political discussion of the day, rather than fall into the traditional 
ideological debate on the role of government. 
 The calculus made in voting decisions of members of Congress (MCs) has been an 
important subject for scholars of the U.S. (Clausen 1974, Kingdon 1981). The importance of 
parties, constituents, and ideology have all been cited as key influences on the roll call votes for 
MCs (Miller and Stokes 1963, Clausen 1973, Mayhew 1974, Fenno 1978, Poole and Daniels 
1985, Cox and McCubbins 2005, Smith 2007, Lee 2009). Yet political scientists and 
commentators alike have come to focus on ideology as measured on a single dimension from 
liberal to conservative as the dominant model of legislative preferences (Converse 1964, Poole 
and Rosenthal 1997). Though there has been some opposition to this concept (see Lee 2009, 
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Crespin and Rhode 2010) the categorization of legislative preferences seems to be a single street 
with a camp on the left, and on the right (Hotelling 1929).  
 Theories of party government suggest that parties will use the amendment process to 
move the ideological character of the bill to the party median, rather than the chamber median 
(Cox and McCubbins 2005). In the case of abortion in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act, the most conservative amendment was the only one considered on the floor, and was 
supported in the roll call by only 27% of the Democratic Caucus. Members of the party 
leadership like Appropriations Chairman Obey shirked the goals President Obama and Speaker 
Pelosi and supported a different policy on the question of abortion, showing how salient issue 
dimensions can rise above party loyalty and traditional ideology. 
 In the following pages, this research seeks to present evidence of the importance of the 
ideology beyond the first dimension on roll call voting in the U.S. House of Representatives. 
After exploring the relevant literature on dimensionality and voting decisions in Congress, this 
study examines the issue dimensions that are relevant for the modern Congress, how and when 
those issues feature on the congressional agenda, and which types of votes in the process these 
issues matter. The results of this analysis suggest that despite the rise of a largely polarized and 
unidimensional Congress, specific issue areas still have an important impact on the voting 
preferences of MCs outside the traditional liberal-to-conservative dimension. 
Voting Behavior in Congress 
The current generation of congressional scholars has produced a model of legislative behavior 
that looks much different than early studies of congressional decision making. A focus on the 
role of ideology has replaced an emphasis on the agency and individual calculus of members of 
Congress (MCs). Studies of the individual’s role in Congress produced a model that stressed 
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economic calculus and reelection goals. These studies moved from a focus on a large number of 
influences and institutions that affect voting (Kingdon 1981, originally 1969) to Mayhew’s 
(1974) conception of MCs as singularly focused on electoral goals. Studies of MCs outside of the 
Capitol demonstrated how they interacted in their district (Fenno 1978), how entrepreneurial 
legislators created “enterprises” to increase their power and influence (Loomis 1990), and the 
how constituencies influenced voting behavior (Miller and Stokes 1963). Constituency 
influences have been demonstrated in studies of the 1824 Congress (Carson and Engstrom 2005) 
and other political development studies (Schickler 2001). However, not all constituency 
influence is equal. Fenno (1978) stressed the importance of personal and reelection 
constituencies, while others have conceptualized a “sub-constituency” or “prospective 
constituency” that focused on the constituency of swing voters and interests as the most 
influential for MCs (Bishin 2000). For these scholars, there is an individual calculus to voting 
beyond ideology. The constituency a MC comes from, and the electoral considerations that 
creates is crucial. 
 Others reject this individual based model of congressional decision making in favor of an 
ideology centered approach. Krehbiel (1993) compared constituent variables and found that 
ADA scores were more effective at accounting for roll-call votes. This focus on policy 
preferences or “ideology” as a model for legislative behavior has been formalized by creating 
ideal points for the preferences of legislators on a one or two dimensional structure of ideology 
(Poole and Daniels 1985, Poole and Rosenthal 1997) and a theory of lawmaking that stresses 
preferences on a one-dimensional scale (Krehbiel 1998). Ideology, usually conceived as a 
consistent pattern of preferences held by legislators, is a troublesome idea for other congressional 
scholars. As Lee (2009) points out, the term ideology is not used in any article on Congress 
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before 1940. It is hard to distinguish “ideology” from party or regional loyalty (Heckman and 
Snyder Jr. 1997, Lee 2009). Quantitative methods may place legislators on ideal points, however 
these techniques inherently capture party and district level concerns as endogenous features of 
ideology (Maltzman and Smith 1994). For these authors, a conception of ideology as the only 
theoretically important influence on roll-call voting, as argued by Krehbiel (1998), is flawed. 
An alternative model of congressional decision making is provided by Clausen (1973), 
who contends that MCs do have consistent preferences, but they vary by the issue area 
considered.  Clausen’s argument centers on the “law of categorization,” which suggests that 
legislators, like the everyday citizen, organize their political preferences based on the category of 
issue being discussed. Within these distinct categories, MC’s decision making can be consistent 
because the areas offer distinct ideological positions. For instance, two MCs who would both 
categorize themselves as “conservative” may have differing opinions on agricultural assistance, 
civil liberties, and foreign involvement because of the distinct nature of those issue arenas. 
 Clausen focused on five categories of policy: government management, social welfare, 
civil liberties, international involvement and agricultural assistance. However, Clausen studied 
the period from 1953-1964 and he notes that these need not be the same dimension over time, but 
some if not all are likely to reappear (Clausen 1973, 84-85). Recent studies show that these 
distinct issue areas can be seen in later Congresses. Crespin and Rohde (2010) find distinct 
voting differences in the areas of military, foreign affairs and agriculture in appropriations 
voting. Talbert and Potoski (2002) used co-sponsoring data and found distinct preferences on as 
many as four dimensions. Even within closely related issues, like rural development and 
agriculture, distinct policy domains can be shown (Hurwitz et al. 2001). Later policy debates like 
women’s issues can also be seen as distinct issue arenas (Norton 1999). Some argue that these 
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competing issue areas show where the influence of parties is lessened by regional, individual or 
constituent influences (Miller and Stokes 1963, Shipan and Lowry 2001).  
Dimensionality in Roll Call Voting 
How many issue areas should congressional researchers consider when conceptualizing the 
preferences of MCs? A first school of thought rejects the idea of policy domains and suggests we 
consider legislative preferences as a spatial model with a single horizontal axis that is often used 
to describe the liberal-conservative divide (Krehbiel 1999). The unidimensional model has 
become almost an assumption in the modern period, as “liberal” and “conservative” approaches 
to the role of government characterize the beliefs of an entire country. Poole and Rosenthal 
(1997) in their seminal work on Congress expand the conception of preferences slightly to 
include a second-dimension that is time sensitive accounting for the important, but divisive, 
issues of that legislative period. Classic second-dimension issues include slavery, civil rights, 
and bimetallism. All of these dimensions were regionally important issues that divide parties. 
They find that 85% of voting can be explained by accounting for preferences in these two 
dimensions (Poole and Rosenthal 1997, 27), earlier research had a similar finding of 80% using 
the first dimension and 87% on the second (Poole and Daniels 1985). The first dimension 
ideological score created by this proceedure is now a central feature of studies on congressional 
voting and ideology, while the second dimension score is largely ignored. As Smith notes, the 
“spatial theorist does not wory about why legislators hold the policy positions they do and so 
treats the policy positions as exogenously determined preferences” (2007, 91).  
Others who take a view similar to Clausen find these unidimensional conceptions 
lacking. Those concerned with specific policy positions prefer a multidimensional view of 
congressional preferences (Koford 1989; Maltzman and Smith 1994; Norton 1999; Snyder and 
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Groseclose 2001; Crespin and Rhode 2010; Dougherty et al 2010). One key argument against a 
single dimension of preferences stresses that scaling techniques used in spatial models can 
identify dimensions but not disaggregate other endogenous components being captured (Smith 
2007). This argument stresses that ideological first-dimension scores are the results of a 
statistical analysis of roll call votes rather than a categorization of votes by a true measure of 
ideology. A vote on the Stupak-Pitts amendment, discussed earlier, would be weighed the same 
as a roll call vote on a proceedural issue. Poole and Roosenthal describe this point when they say 
dimensional findings are “blind .. to the substance of the vote” (1997, 7). A second key argument 
mounted by Koford suggests that while one dimension may be clearly identified, other 
dimensions can be seen throughout the legislative process and they must be explained as well 
(1989, 960). Ideological scores based only on roll call voting ignore the complexity of policy 
issue dimensions that can arise in legislative proposals and committee deliberation.   
Poole and Rosenthal challenge Clausen’s policy-context dependent decision rule in their 
book, using the 95th Congress as an example to test Clausen’s model against their own model 
that uses a procedure called NOMINATE to create ideological scores for legislators in two 
dimensions (1997, 54-55 & 233; Carroll et al. 2011). In their defense of a two-dimensional 
structure of preferences, they often miscategorize the nature of Clausen’s argument. While they 
find that Clausen’s policy areas fail to generate a separate spatial dimension, they ignore the 
much longer time horizon used by Clausen, as well as his contention that the policy dimensions 
he found may be more specific to his period of study. More importantly, these schools of thought 
conflict in their goals. Clausen’s goal is to describe voting calculus and decisions made in 
Congress. Distinctively different in aim, Poole and Rosenthal work to achieve ideological scores 
to predict outcomes and generate effective classifications. Finally, Poole and Rosenthal find that 
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their model outperforms any constituency based model. This should not be surprising, as the 
NOMINATE procedure inherently capture endogenous features of preferences, like constituency 
influences, yet they ignore the nuance of which constituency is effecting voting behavior (Fenno 
1978; Bishin 2000). Voting on issues like abortion and gun rights may matter to specific parts of 
a personal or primary constituency. Finally, the technique used by Poole and Rosenthal may 
“outperform” other models, but statistical explanatory power is far different than theoretical and 
conceptual explanatory power. There is utility in the use of ideological voting scores, but 
reverting to this assumption in all cases neglects the nuance and layers used by legislators in their 
voting decisions.  
Beyond the First Dimension: The Role of Issues 
The recent scholarship finding evidence of multi-issue dimensions in congressional voting 
provides support for a return to Clausen’s law of categorization. Many individual examples of 
legislators who break from their traditional ideology to support causes in individual issue areas 
can be found, from pro-choice Republicans to NRA-rated Democrats. Moving from this 
anecdotal support, a quantitative approach to finding which issue areas break the traditional 
ideological dimension in the modern Congress can shed light on areas where legislators are 
operating under the expectations of the law of categorization. 
Research Strategy 
This research will use data from the Public Institutions and Public Choice (PIPC) database 
(Rhode 2004), combined with Poole and Rosenthal’s DW -NOMINATE roll call data (Carroll et 
al 2011) to examine issue areas in the 83-95
th
 Congress and the 96
th
 to the 107
th
 Congress. The 
95
th
 Congress was chosen as a dividing line for a number of reasons. Poole and Rosenthal argue 
that the 95
th
 Congress was an example of a unidimensional Congress with the largest number of 
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roll-call votes, further they argue that “from the late 1970s onward, roll call voting again became 
largely a matter of positioning on a single liberal/conservative” dimension (1997, 5). Other 
congressional scholars have described this period in Congress as “between legislative eras” 
(Loomis 1990, 15). Dividing the dataset equally, also fits Clausen’s argument about the long 
time horizon of salient policy domains. The roll-call votes in this data base are limited compared 
to the universe of roll-call votes in this period, as unanimous votes were not scaled in the DW-
NOMINATE procedure and were dropped from analysis.   
The dependent variable considered is the absolute value of the cutting line created in a 
two dimensional space to classify voting on the roll call. This procedure produces a line that 
correctly classifies a mean of 86% of votes in the pre-96
th
 Congress, and 89% of votes in the 
post-96
th
 Congress. The cut line produced is an angle separating the yeas and nays in the space, 
and the resulting angle can explain much about the dimensionality of the vote. Consider a vote 
with a 90 degree cutting angle; its vertical position means that the horizontal, liberal-
conservative ideology is the only important dimension to classify votes. Alternatively, consider a 
horizontal line with slope of zero degrees, which would run parallel or on top of the traditional 
first dimension. This cutting angle would exclusively use the second dimension to classify votes. 
Using this observation, the “steepness” of the cutting line explains how much leverage the 
second dimension has at classifying votes. The absolute value of the cutting line measures the 
steepness of each cutting angle as it removes the impact of negative or positively sloped cutting 
angles. 
Issue Areas and Independent Variables 
This research tests Clausen’s theory of policy context decision rule by examining how different 
policy areas affect the steepness of the cutting line produced by the D-W NOMINATE 
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classification scheme. Beyond original issues considered by Clausen, additional areas are added 
to this analysis that reflect the categorization component of Clausen’s theory. Issue area codes 
for gun control and abortion are often seen as areas of independence for Republicans and 
Democrats alike, and provide areas for position taking to reach primary or “prospective” 
constituencies (Fenno 1978, Bishin 2000). 
Rural Development and Agriculture: These areas have been cited as the source of the extra 
dimensional preferences in many Congresses (Poole and Daniels 1985; Poole and Rosenthal 
1997). Hurwitz et al (2001) found that agriculture and rural space is multi-dimensional, even 
within legislation. Hansen (1991) found significant impacts for the farm lobby on Congress in 
his research. Additionally, regional and constituent concerns could be captured by these areas. 
Rural Development is a classification of appropriations voting, whereas the variable for 
Agriculture includes subsidies and price supports, food stamps, farm credit and other non-
appropriations related agriculture bills. As a regional influence, these issues should decrease the 
steepness of the cutting lines. 
Foreign Policy: International involvement was one of Clausen’s examples of a distinct policy 
domain (1973). Other researchers have found Foreign Policy to be an important dimension of 
congressional decision making (Talbert and Potoski 2002; Crespin and Rhode 2010). 
Alternatively, Poole and Daniels found that Foreign Policy was best captured by the first 
dimension in their study (1985). Following the theory of Elazar (1994), varying regional and 
individual member’s perspectives on foreign involvement should lead to a negative coefficient. 
Energy and Environment: Talbert and Potoski (2002) find an environmental dimension to 
congressional voting. Additionally, issues in this policy area could have constituent, regional, or 
interest group influences. This category includes votes on oil exploration, energy subsidies, 
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pollution, National Parks, and vehicle emissions among others. These votes are hypothesized to 
decrease steepness of the cutting line. 
Abortion: Following Norton (1999), who found evidence of dimensionality on gender voting in 
Congress, votes on abortion will be examined. A category for “gender issues” is not available in 
the PIPC dataset used to code issue content. Absent a good measure, roll call votes within the 
health and human services category were used which include the classifications of “family 
planning” and “abortion”. Abortion votes touch on a salient issue area to many primary 
constituencies and often are considered outside the traditional liberal to conservative dimension. 
Further, the political culture of regions can influence attitudes towards issue of family planning 
and abortion (Elazar 1994). Based on these theories, votes in this category should hypothetically 
decrease the steepness of the cutting angle showing a negative coefficient. 
Crime and Criminal Justice: Civil liberties made Clausen’s list of distinct issue areas and this 
category of votes in the PIPC classification model fits most closely with the civil liberties arena 
outline by Clausen. This includes votes on pornography, drug control, criminal procedure, law 
enforcement assistance and others. Like the abortion vote variable, this category includes many 
social issues that were often of a second dimension.  
Gun Control: Gun Control is also included in crime and criminal justice category, but is 
controlled for by an additional variable. Preferences on gun rights legislation would, 
theoretically, be difficult to classify on a liberal-conservative scale under traditional definitions. 
Additionally, gun rights voters could be a significant component of a “prospective” constituency 
as outlined by Bishin (2000). Gun control issues may divide parties as well as urban and rural 
legislators; they should affect the cutting angle. 
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Civil Rights: Poole and Rosenthal find that civil rights was the main issue comprising the 
second dimension in the House for the 81
st
, 86
th
, 87
th
, 90
th
, 92
nd
, 94
th
, 96
th
, and 97
th
 Congresses 
(1997, 51). Classification success should increase for civil rights issues if it is captured by the 
second dimension. In the PIPC conception, this includes pay equity, age discrimination, gay 
rights, busing, as well the historical components usually classified as “civil rights” issues. 
Including this variable in the model also helps test for model robustness. If civil rights was a key, 
if not the only, component of the second dimension for a significant era in congressional history, 
there should be a large effect for civil rights legislation on the angle of the cutting line.  
Party and Control Variables: Three additional variables were added to the models. First, a 
variable for which legislative session the vote is taken in is included. Members may vote 
differently on policy areas that could impact their electoral chances, especially as the election 
approaches. Second, dummy variables were added to include if roll call was a final passage or 
amendment vote. We should expect a more active second dimension on amendment voting 
because such votes often split parties, and because of this they hamper the success of a 
unidimensional classification structure.  
Results and Discussion 
The results of the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models can be found in Table 1. The 
data show cautious support for issue-based dimensionality in voting behavior in Congress during 
the two eras. Poole and Rosenthal cited civil rights as the issue captured by the second dimension 
during much of the period of votes pooled to make the pre-96
th
 model. As per that hypothesis, 
the cutting angle for civil rights issues were about 14 degrees less steep than a typical issue with 
a low standard error of a less than 2 degrees. This result is helpful to confirm the model design. 
However, other issue variables in the pre-96
th
 Congress show that roll call voting on rural issues, 
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agriculture, foreign policy, gun rights, and environmental issues had a statistically significant 
reduction in the steepness, and therefore unidimensional structure of the votes. Roll call votes on 
amendments also showed significant effects on the cutting line, but only by a few degrees.  
The post-96
th
 Congress models found results similar to the model for the previous era. 
Rural development, agriculture, gun rights, and energy issues all reduced the steepness of the 
cutting line as with the previous period. The magnitude of the effect varied in some cases, as 
rural issues’ effect on steepness lessened in the post-96
th
 model. However, the most interesting 
change was the lack of significance for civil rights issues, replaced by the significance of 
abortion issues, with abortion issues becoming the second highest coefficient next to gun rights 
issues.  There were positive and significant coefficients for crime/criminal justice issues, and 
final passage votes, suggesting these votes were more unidimensional than the others considered.  
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The variable for the session of the roll call was significant and negative. Roll calls which 
took place in the second session of a Congress, on average, were less clearly classified by the 
unidimensional structure. This provides some support for an electoral focus for both individual 
MCs and parties. As the biennial election of Congress nears, members of Congress are more 
likely to depart from their first dimension ideological preferences.  If the first dimension captures 
party loyalty (Poole and Rosenthal 1997, 35), this result suggests individual concerns may trump 
party loyalty as the election looms.  
Figure 1 shows graphically the changes between issue areas and party control between 
the pre and post-96
th
 Congress.  The Zelig program (Kosuke, King and Lau 2007) was used to 
conduct a 10,000-vote simulation based on the models specified in Table 1; these graphs show 
the expected cut line of simulated votes in each issue area with a 95% confidence interval. The 
horizontal line shown is the median of the absolute cut line in each period which can be used for 
comparison to the average roll call vote. As is evident on the graph, there were very few roll call 
votes on abortion and gun rights issues in the pre-96
th
 Congresses, so the confidence interval 
shown is very large. The most striking evidence from the figure is the change in the status of 
civil rights issues, and the rise of abortion issues on the second dimension.  
Statistical spatial modeling of roll call votes can produce a one dimensional ideology that 
allows for correct classification of a high percentage of votes. But the models presented here 
suggest that there is systematic underperformance in that approach when considering specific 
issue voting. These areas of underperformance are not fatal to the utility of ideology scores or the 
unidimensional model. In fact, these may actually help to illuminate features of congressional 
voting behavior and explain what is left unexplained from the unidimensional model.  
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These results lend support to Clausen’s policy context-dependent voting theory. Clausen 
notes, however, the salient policy contexts vary over time. Historically, regional concerns have 
been key sources for voting outside of traditional party or ideological-or first dimension- 
preferences. Regional based concerns like agriculture were significantly classified at a lower 
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level, so too were classic “culture war” issues like abortion and gun rights. Though it is possible 
these differences in culture are regional in nature as well (Elazar 1994). Discovering the 
character and content of the second dimension in the modern period, specifically within each 
Congress, is important. Dimensionality is a useful topic insomuch as it informs our thoughts on 
voting behavior in Congress at a higher level. In this next stage, this research will focus on 
identifying which of these issues identified in the preceding analysis are affecting voting in each 
Congress in the post-96
th
 era. 
The Modern Congress and the Second Dimension 
The evidence presented in the previous section provides support that issue areas have had a 
systematic correlation with the performance of the unidimensional model in the modern 
Congress. The models investigated previously cover 10,241 votes from 24 different 
congressional sessions, precluding the nuanced analysis required to judge the impact of these 
specific issue focuses in congressional voting. Looking at each Congress in the data set 
individually provides opportunities to see when these issues matter, and what effect they may 
have on dimensionality. 
 Clausen found stability for his issue dimensions over time, arguing that MCs maintained 
a consistent categorization of these issues in their decisions, but not that these issue 
categorizations maintained importance in each Congress. In one chapter, he explores the 
importance of each of the issue categories on voting in the 91
st
 Congress and finds that only 4 of 
the 5 issue dimensions are operating (1973, 77). The results presented in Table 1 show that issue 
dimensions, most of which Clausen used in his original analysis, have continued to be significant 
beyond his period of study. That is not to say that they have been important in every Congress 
but rather, that there is evidence for the consistency of these issue dimensions over time. 
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Research Strategy 
To examine the importance of these issue areas within each Congress, subsets of data were 
created for individual Congresses in the post-96
th
 era. Data again were combined from the same 
sources (Rhode 2004, Carroll et al. 2011). The dependent variable is again the steepness of the 
cutting line created in DW-NOMINATE process as measured in the degrees. The number of 
scaled votes that were included in analysis varied from 518 in the 107
th
 Congress to 1176 in the 
104
th
. The results of these models are in Tables 2 and 3.   
 The models were specified to include every dichotomous variable for issue areas included 
previously, however in some Congresses these issues were not featured on any roll call vote as 
coded by the PIPC project (Rhode 2004). Where no results are displayed, as with gun control 
issues in the 96-98
th
 Congress this is the result of no observations, not absence from the model. 
In the following pages, each issue area will be considered individually.   
Rural Development: Rural development was a significant variable at lowering the steepness of 
the cutting angle in both periods examined previously. The results presented in these tables 
suggest that it has been an important issue area on the second dimension, but only for specific 
Congresses. Each significant coefficient for rural issues (103-105
th
, 107
th
 Congresses) was in 
double digits, reaching a peak of an average 30 degree effect in the 104
th
 Congress. The intercept 
in the 104
th
 is 82, suggesting that most of the roll call votes in this session were more 
unidimensional.  
Agriculture: Agricultural assistance had statistical significance and high magnitude coefficients 
in a majority of the specific Congresses examined. When pooled, agriculture issues were 
associated with an on average reduction of 13 degrees in the cutting line, yet in the 107
th
 
Congress the coefficient was over twice that estimate. 
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For the 107
th
 Congress, agriculture votes had an, on average, a change of 150% the standard 
deviation of the dependent variable. Looking at the error terms in the tables suggests the cases 
where the agriculture variable was not statistically significant may have been due to lack of 
observations.  
Foreign Policy: The model presented in Table 1 suggested some influence for foreign policy 
issues on the cutting angle, yet it was low in magnitude. The coefficient showed only a one-fifth 
change in the standard deviation of the dependent variable. When looking at each Congress 
individually presented in Tables 2 and 3, these results seem to vanish. In no Congress was this 
issue area shown to affect the dimensionality of the vote.  
Abortion: The most interesting results presented in this model show the rise of abortion as a 
dimensional issue in Congress. The 96
th
-101
st
 Congress show nearly no votes on abortion issues, 
in most cases being dropped as a variable because no votes were classified in this issue area. 
From the 102
nd
 -107
th
 Congress roll call votes on abortion had a consistently flatter cutting angle 
than the other issues considered.  
Energy and Environment: Energy and environmental issues were sporadic in their impact on 
the dimensionality of roll call votes, only having significant effects in four of the twelve 
Congresses modeled. In the cases they were significant, their coefficients were less than half that 
of other issue areas in the model.  
Crime: In all of the models, only four variables showed positive and significant effects on the 
steepness of the cutting line. Three of these cases were in the crime and criminal justice variable. 
Though the magnitude was less than other variables, this suggests that votes on crime and 
criminal justice are explained by liberal to conservative ideology more than other issue areas.   
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Civil Rights: The results in Table 1 showed that civil rights had not been an issue area with any 
leverage on the cutting angles of votes in the post-96
th
 Congress. In only one Congress did the 
issue have a significant effect (p-value=0.036). This result suggests that the civil rights 
dimension of voting in Congress has largely disappeared and, if anything, on civil rights is 
largely expressed on the first dimension. 
Gun Control: The largest coefficient in the post-96
th
 Congress model in Table 1 was found in 
the issue variable for gun control. When we look at the level of each Congress, we see that this 
was largely the impact of a few years of congressional work. In the 104
th
 Congress the 
coefficient doubles the standard deviation of the dependent variable, representing the largest 
impact of the variables in the models in Tables 2 and 3. In the following 105
th
 Congress there are 
no recorded votes coded as gun control issues, 21 votes in 106
th
, and no votes again in the 107
th
 
Congress. 
 Figure 2 provides the results of a 10,000 vote simulation based on the regression model 
for the 104
th
 Congress (Kosuke, King and Lau 2007). The 104
th
 Congress, the first term of 
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Speaker Newt Gingrich and the “Contract with America” was chosen because it has the highest 
number of cases, highest r², and largest initial intercept of 82, suggesting a mainly 
unidimensional Congress. 
 A horizontal line was placed at the median cutting line of 72.15, the mean was 66, with a 
standard deviation of 19.2. The bars in each issue area represent the 95% confidence intervals for 
each issue area. These results can be compared with Figure 1, which displayed the simulation 
results for the pre and post 96
th
 Congress. The low levels of voting in  
many of the issue areas precluding an over focus on the results of this simulation. However, the 
maximum 95% confidence interval for votes on rural development and abortion issues is one 
standard deviation “flatter” from the mean cutting line. In the 101
st
 Congress, no roll call votes 
were coded as abortion votes, and rural issues were not correlated with a lower cutting line.  
Agenda Setting and Dimensionality 
The literature on agenda setting provides theories as to why we should expect certain issues to 
become salient in any given time period. As with Clausen’s “law of categorization” these ideas 
are drawn from decision making theories in psychology. Some individuals may pride themselves 
as multi-taskers, but cognitive processing is generally categorized by selective information and 
“bottlenecks” of attention (Baumgartner and Jones 2002, 16). This dynamic can also be 
described as serial, rather than parallel, processing where attention to issues is focused on a case 
by case, rather than multiple cases at once. For individuals, this is one way rational behavior is 
“bounded” or limited. While this is a useful model of individual and institutional behavior, there 
are obvious capacities for Congress to consider multiple issues (for instance: Baumgartner and 
Gold 2002, 280-281). It may be more useful to think of serial processing in terms of attention 
levels in institutions, rather than the work itself. The issues on the second dimension historically 
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were often the most salient issues of the time. Civil rights and bimetallism were the subject of 
much legislative action, debate, and attention given by Congress in those periods.  
 Slavery, the coinage of silver, and voting rights have had their place on the congressional 
agenda, and will not be the subject of another congressional vote. Issues routinely hit the public 
agenda and then disappear. New agenda issues in which parties have do not have a consistent 
positions create the possibility for specific issue dimensions to rise on the agenda. Rural issues, 
abortion, and gun control votes were almost nonexistent in Table 2, but they became some of the 
most significant contributors to the dimensionality of voting from 102
nd
-107
th
 Congress. 
 The logic of Clausen’s law of categorization lies in the fact that legislators have general 
characterizations of issues that can be used to guide their decision making on specific roll call 
votes. It is likely that positions on gun control and abortion of legislators have not changed, but 
the agenda did. As issue dimensions become relevant, or disappear as the case may be, the 
importance of issue areas or a second dimension may change. As the models from the Reagan 
era show (97-100
th
), issue areas played no role in affecting dimensionality. Clausen, writing 
about the disappearance of dimensions explained: 
“[W]e may find that some of the five dimensions are currently viable whereas others have 
disappeared… In the latter instance, it is anticipated that the new dimensions will have emerged in 
place of the old. But this is no cause for anxiety, rather, it is a reason for excitement, as the 
dynamics of change have potential for exposing the conditions that produce new policy 
dimensions and the demise of old. (1973, 58)” 
The analysis presented in Tables 2 and 3 show some concrete examples of issue dimensions 
becoming part of the congressional agenda and affecting the usual liberal to conservative 
separation of voting behavior. Cases like the Reagan-era unidimensionality, and the rise and 
subsequent disappearance of gun control during the period studied present important examples of 
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the dynamic nature of issue attention and dimensionality. Comparing Figures 1 and 2 
demonstrates that individual issue areas don’t seem to have a large effect in terms of magnitude 
on dimensionality in a given era, but in a specific congress we could expect the average cutting 
line to be below 45 degrees. The apparent dominance of the liberal-to-conservative dimension is 
lessened when examining specific issue areas in a concise time period. 
Dimensionality in the Legislative Process 
The previous sections have documented how second dimension issue preferences can affect roll 
call voting. In the first section, the research suggested that issue areas consistently affect the 
importance of the second dimension on roll call votes across legislative eras. The models 
presented also provide evidence for the disappearance of the civil rights issue dimension and the 
rise of the abortion dimension. This result informed the second section, which focused on the 
role these dimensions can play in a shorter time periods by examining specific meetings of 
Congress. Many of the issue areas described by Clausen nearly 40 years ago still seem to be 
important dimensions in roll call votes. Agriculture and rural development issues have had 
significant effects, both statistically and in magnitude, on the relevance of the second dimension 
on roll call voting. While issues may not always be agenda items in a given Congress, the 
relevance of Clausen’s law of categorization seems to hold. These results point to a third 
important question, where in the process are these votes occurring?  
 Some evidence for the nature of these votes can be found in the preceding analysis. In 
Table 2, we see the coefficient for final passage and amendment voting consistently significant 
and in the positive direction. As the 104
th
 Congress emerges in Table 3, however, we see the 
coefficients flip signs in the cases they are significant. In the earlier period, amendments and 
final passage roll calls associated with a stronger first ideological dimension. In cases like the 
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98th and 100
th
 Congress, these were the only variables found to be significant. Amendments that 
were the subject of roll call votes during the 104
th
-106
th
 Congress were correlated with stronger 
second dimension of preferences, on average.  
 Cox and McCubbin’s (2005) cartel theory of party government asserts that parties should 
avoid any bringing any issues to the floor that might produce intra party conflict. Successful 
party leadership, in the pure form of this theory, will be unidimensional resulting in policy 
structured around the majority median legislator with consistent minority party losses. Evidence 
suggests that gatekeeping power of committees exercised by the majority party lowers the 
perceived unidimensional structure of voting (Snyder 1992), and that, during periods of strong 
majority parties agenda setting powers push back latent dimensionality (Dougherty et al 2010). 
For cartel theorists, an effective vote would have a 90 degree cut line, running perpendicular to 
the first ideological dimension. From this perspective, it should be surprising that the House of 
Representatives, with rules on debate and amendments, should see extra dimensionality at all. 
 Some party splitting votes may be good for the majority party. We could expect members 
to be given the freedom to break with parties on specific issues for electoral reasons (Mayhew 
1974). The wide variation in the culture and ideology of the individual constituencies might 
necessitate party leaders allowing members opportunities for “position taking” (Fenno 1978, 
Elazar 1994). A majority party relies on maintaining its membership beyond the current session. 
Theoretical reasons may explain second dimension voting even if we remove the assumption of 
party influence. Roll calls poorly explained by a single dimension may just be a necessary 
consequence of legislators expressing preferences and moving the bill to the floor median or 
“pivotal” ideological point to ensure passage (Black 1948, Krehbiel 1998).   
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Research Strategy 
To study the effect of the vote type and issue areas on the dimensionality of votes, a subset of 
votes in the Clinton era (103-106
th
 Congresses) was created from the original dataset used in the 
preceding sections. An OLS regression model using the absolute value of the cut line was 
created. A dichotomous variable was created to code the type of vote. Votes on procedures were 
coded 1 and non-procedural votes were coded 0. Using the PIPC dataset used previously (Rhode 
2004, Carroll et al 2011), non-procedural votes include the content of the final passage and 
amendment variables used previously as well as votes on veto overrides and the final passage of 
resolutions. The dichotomous variable for procedure was interacted with the significant variables 
for the period as displayed in Table 3: gun rights, agriculture, abortion, rural development and 
energy environment. The results of this model are presented in Table 4. 
 
 The results in Table 4 are striking. The interactive variables show a complete reversal of 
the coefficients for the individual issue dimension codes. In every case, the coefficient for the 
 
 
30 
 
interactive variable was higher than the individual issue code. This suggests that when the vote 
on an issue deals with a procedural item, the second dimension’s importance was reversed. There 
were 3965 votes in the Clinton presidency used in this analysis, of which 1346 were procedural. 
Importantly, 333 were on the passage of special rules, and of the 170 were motions on the 
previous question 143 involved the passage of special rules. The importance of the structure of 
these rules, and the ability for negative agenda control by parties through these rules has been 
demonstrated in previously (Oleszek 2007). If legislators are voting based on unidimensional 
and, by extension, partisan preferences solely on procedural issues this is a significant finding. 
 What is perhaps more intriguing is the results for gun rights and abortion issues on 
procedural votes. Contrary to the way the rest of the variables perform, there was no significant 
influence for these issue dimensions in procedural votes. There may be good reason for these 
results. Groups like the National Rifle Association and Brady Campaign in gun control issues, 
and National Right to Life Committee (NRLC) and National Abortion Rights Action League 
(NARAL) create legislative profiles for MCs on issues based on roll call votes (Roberts and Bell 
2008). These votes are often on final passage and amendment votes, but these procedural 
motions are used for issues where roll calls were not taken. Two of the eight votes for NARAL 
in 2011 were procedural motions, two of 10 NRLC’s votes were on procedural votes. Position 
taking may have been a crucial incentive for members of Congress when votes concern issues so 
important to the primary or prospective constituency (Fenno 1978, Bishin 2000). 
 Is it possible the results presented in Table 4 are due to the partisanship that marked the 
Clinton presidency? When parties are strong at controlling the floor agenda, voting on procedural 
issues should in theory be more unidimensional and party based, even if issue activity is affected 
by the second dimension. To test this idea, an OLS model was created see how if the interactive 
 
 
31 
 
effect of procedural votes in issue areas was consistent. This model used the dataset from the 
first model in Table 1, the pre 96
th
 Congress model (1953-1980). The consistent dimensionality 
of rural and agriculture issues across these periods allowed for comparison, additionally the 
disappearance of votes coded as civil rights and the rise of abortion roll call votes allowed for 
testing of a salient social category in each period. The results are presented in Table 5 below. 
 
 While procedure votes are associated with a minimal increase in the steepness of the cut 
line, the results for the pre-96
th
 Congress are much different than the Clinton presidency. A few 
hypotheses for this result should be considered. It is possible that the kind of interest group 
activity suggested previously is at work here as well (see Hansen 1991). It could also be a result 
of a change in procedural norms and strategies. The special rule seems a likely suspect, but the 
pre-96
th
 universe of votes includes 344 votes on special rules out of 1623 procedural votes 
(21.1%) compared to 333 special rule votes of 1346 procedure roll calls (24.7%) in the Clinton 
presidency. A final hypothesis is that general party systems or eras are responsible for this 
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dynamic. Perhaps the “Conservative Coalition” years in the House procedure votes were affected 
by two dimensions and in the partisan “Contract with America” era of impeachment the first 
dimension party ideology was dominant. In any of these cases, the effect of the type of vote on 
the dimensionality of the vote warrants further research.  
Conclusion: The Role and Importance of Issues on the Second Dimension 
This research sought to explore the importance of the second dimension in congressional voting 
in the modern Congress. Second dimension issues have been critically important in American 
history, and the persistence of party division on key political issues into the modern Congress 
provided support that the issues outside the liberal to conservative continuum were not as 
insignificant as some authors have claimed. By exploring the relevance of the second dimension 
on roll call voting from three different perspectives, this study has shown consistent support for 
the impact of second dimension preferences and for Aage Clausen’s “law of categorization” and 
issue areas.  
 In the first section of this paper two legislative eras were examined to explore the 
persistence of the issue areas outline by Clausen and other theorists. The periods from 1953-1979 
(83-96th Congress) and 1980-2008 (97
th
-110
th
 Congress) both had statistically significant effects 
for rural development, agriculture assistance and gun rights issues on the dimensionality of the 
roll call vote. The civil rights issue dimension in the pre-96
th
 Congress seems to have been 
replaced as rise the abortion issue dimension in the post-96
th
 Congress proved to have significant 
effects. These results show the continuity of issue dimensions across a wide stretch of 
congressional history, but also that new issues may rise to significance. 
 The results of the first part of this analysis showed both the consistency of issues like 
agriculture, and the emergence of new issues. Given the evidence of issue intrusion, the next step 
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in this research was to explore how these individual issue areas could affect the dimensionality 
of roll call voting within specific meetings of Congress. Looking at 12 different Congresses, 
there is indeed great variability in the importance of each issue over time. In the first six 
congresses (96
th
-101
st
) there were often not even enough roll call votes on abortion to include the 
variable in the analysis, in the following six congresses it became one of the most significant 
issue areas affecting the dimensionality of voting. A similar dynamic was true for gun and rural 
issues. While the evidence for the impact of the second dimension was still seen in this analysis, 
the influence of the agenda was also apparent.  
 The final section of this research explored whether issue dimensions were evident in 
procedural votes, or only on roll calls affecting the language of legislation. The evidence here 
was surprising. When looking at the Clinton-era roll call votes, a vote on an agriculture issue was 
shown to be associated with an on average 26 degree decrease in the absolute value of the cutting 
angle. Yet when an interactive variable was included to see how procedural votes on agriculture 
affected the cutting line, the result was an average increase of 35 degrees. The reversal in the 
sign of the coefficients was surprising, procedural votes were significantly more unidimensional 
than votes on amendments and final passage. This could be explained by features of the Clinton 
era House, however. The evidence from a comparison model created with the pre 96
th
 Congress 
data showed less dimensionality as procedural votes did not have a statistically significant effect 
on the cutting line of votes in the earlier period.  
 The evidence presented in the models and simulations all confirm the vibrant role of issue 
areas play on the dimensionality of voting in the modern U.S. House. This analysis, however, is 
only the next step of many in a growing recent literature on the dimensionality in Congress 
(Crespin and Rhode 2010, Dougherty et al 2010). Many questions are left to be answered, and 
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the results suggesting how dimensionality changes with the type of vote may provoke more 
questions than the results answer. The Senate was not even included in this analysis, precluding 
any discussion of the upper house in this analysis. From case studies of dimensionality and the 
important issue areas within each Congress- or within each chamber- to the role of procedure and 
parties on the dimensionality of roll call votes, there are many avenues and questions left for 
future research. 
 In their work on roll call voting, Poole and Rosenthal argue that “from the late 1970s 
onward, roll call voting again became largely a matter of positioning on a single 
liberal/conservative dimension (1997, 5).” It cannot be argued that the liberal to conservative 
dimension is unimportant, and the likelihood of another issue matching civil rights as a second 
dimension component is doubtful. However, this research supports challenges to the claim of a 
strictly unidimensional Congress (Koford 1989, Wilcox and Clausen 1991, Crespin and Rhode 
2010). The aggregation of roll call votes may just create the appearance of a nearly dominant 
unidimensional structure. Given position taking motives and the regional interests of a district 
based congressional constituency, specific issue areas will continue to conflict with the liberal to 
conservative ideology of some legislators. The political importance of these issue areas means 
the power of the second dimension issues should not be overlooked. Future research is needed to 
help explore both the causes and implications of these findings. But as the story of the Stupak 
amendment showed, these second dimension issues are crucial to congressional politics and 
policymaking. 
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